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Abstract 
We analyze the relationship between returns on equity and long-term government bonds in the crisis-hit 
Eurozone peripheral economies. In particular, we are interested in the stability of the relationship across 
differing market conditions and if long-term bonds act as a safe haven for equity investors during periods 
of financial distress. Employing a Markov-switching vector autoregression model with three regimes, we 
find that the stock-bond relationship varies across market conditions and across countries. Overall we 
observe increased comovement during the crisis regimes at the market level, with the relationship between 
the financial sectors and the domestic sovereign bond being its most important driver across countries. 
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1. Introduction 
 The recent financial turbulence in the Eurozone was a prolonged period of crisis, with the 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis following quickly on from the international banking crisis. 
Throughout this period, equity investors sought to protect their wealth by shedding risky assets 
and diversifying their portfolio into safer alternatives, particularly those who exhibit either 
permanently low correlation with their equity portfolio or whose return is negatively correlated 
with the equity return during stock market downturns. The latter is often referred to as a ‘safe-
haven’ asset and usually has the feature that the relationship between the two asset classes under 
consideration varies over time. A safe-haven asset need not permanently exhibit a negative (or 
zero) correlation with equity but must have this characteristic during equity market declines. Much 
of the extant literature on safe-haven assets investigates the relationship between equity and long-
term sovereign bonds as the latter are expected to deliver a stable return and be less sensitive to 
corporate shocks. 
 The relationship between stock and sovereign bond returns has been studied extensively 
for the U.S. The early literature suggests that long-term bonds provide a good hedge and act as a 
‘safe haven’ for equity investors. For example, Fleming et al. (1998) and Scruggs and Glabadanidis 
(2003) both find that stock market shocks elicit little response in measures of bond market risk. 
More recently, studies such as Baele et al. (2010) document substantial time-variation in the co-
movements of stocks and sovereign bonds. One popular explanation is that the time-varying 
relationship depends on market conditions and that during episodes of stock market turbulence, 
there is a ‘flight-to-safety’ reaction whereby investors flee equity markets and take refuge in 
relatively safe assets, such as government bonds. Evidence consistent with this is provided by 
Connolly et al. (2005), Guidolin and Timmermann (2006), Anderson et al. (2008), Yang et al. 
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(2009) and Flavin et al. (2014) among others, who all report a negative stock-bond relationship 
during equity market declines. This supports the view that government bonds provide an effective 
hedge against equity risk during stock market downturns.  
This relationship also seems to hold for stocks and domestic sovereign bonds, during 
periods of financial market turbulence, in non-U.S. markets. For example, Baur and Lucey (2009) 
find negative stock-bond correlations during equity market downturns for eight developed 
markets, while Chang and Hsueh (2013) confirm this finding for a group of Asia-Pacific countries. 
However, during the most recent financial crisis, a different pattern has begun to emerge for some 
of the Eurozone periphery countries, casting doubts on the diversification potential of sovereign 
bonds for equity investors. Jammazi et al. (2015) find a positive stock-bond relationship in Spain, 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Belgium since the beginning of the European sovereign debt crisis 
in late 2009. They attribute this to investors moving away from stock and government bond 
markets of peripheral countries to invest in economies with more solid fundamentals. Similarly, 
Acosta-González et al. (2016) report that, during the recent crisis, the correlation between bond 
and stock returns inverted from negative to positive in countries like Italy and Spain, while Flavin 
(2019), using a similar methodology to that employed here, finds positive co-movement between 
stock (at the broadest market level) and bond returns in the crisis-hit peripheral Eurozone states 
during the most recent crisis.  These studies imply that domestic sovereign bonds may not always 
act as a safe haven for equity investors, particularly during periods of high volatility in sovereign 
bond markets. 
 We re-visit this issue and focus on the Eurozone countries worst affected by the crisis; 
namely Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, the so called GIIPS countries. We choose this 
set of countries in an effort to explain the recent evidence of a positive relationship between 
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domestic stocks and sovereign bonds during the crisis. We delve deeper into the driving forces 
behind this change in stock-bond co-movement, using a relatively new methodology, by 
undertaking a sectoral analysis of the GIIPS financial markets.  
Our main innovation is to look at the relationship between equity and sovereign bond 
returns at a sectoral level. The aforementioned literature has predominantly focused on this 
relationship at the stock market index level, but this may conceal important cross-sectoral 
differences. An analysis at this finer level of disaggregation has the potential to uncover these 
differences, which may be important for both investors and policy makers. In particular, it allows 
us to ascertain if the documented changes at the country level are pervasive across all sectors or 
result from particular industries. This information is relevant to investors who hold equity 
portfolios diversified across industries and it can be used to distinguish between sectors whose risk 
can and cannot be effective hedged by domestic sovereign bonds during a financial crisis. 
Similarly, government policy makers bidding to curb the contagious spread of a crisis and / or 
persuade bond investors as to the creditworthiness of their sovereign bonds may need to identify 
the sectors that cause most spillovers during a crisis. This disaggregated information will allow 
them to focus on particular sectors as they strive to build a strong, resilient economy. 
Specifically, we analyse the relationship between sectoral equity indices and a 10-year 
sovereign bond using a Markov-switching vector autoregression (MS-VAR) model which allows 
us to assess the time-variation in the conditional correlation across market conditions. The MS-
VAR approach is ideally suited to address this question. Firstly, the regime-switching framework 
is designed to deal with non-contiguous data, i.e. it accommodates samples of calm interspersed 
with crisis events (that is the dates do not have to be contiguous). This is particularly useful over 
our sample period when financial markets were hit with a series of shocks over a relatively long 
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time period and, as we show later, we identify three regimes over our sample – a period of calm 
(normal) markets and two distinct phases of the crisis. Secondly, the VAR framework allows us to 
model the interactions of the variables in the system and identify the asset-specific shocks. Thirdly, 
we can generate regime-specific generalized impulse response functions (GIRFs) to assess the 
cross-market reactions to a shock. The GIRFs allow us to assess the relative importance of stock 
and bond market shocks in generating cross-market comovement and enable us to easily detect 
changes in the shock transmission between regimes.  
First, the analysis is conducted for each country’s equity market index and a domestic 10-
year sovereign bond and we confirm the aforementioned pattern at the overall market level, i.e. 
returns on domestic long-term sovereign bonds and equity have exhibited positive comovement 
during the recent crisis, for all countries except Ireland. Ireland is different in a number of respects. 
Firstly, it is the only one of the GIIPS to suffer higher asset return volatility during the global 
banking crisis (2007-09) than during the period of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and secondly, 
the two domestic asset classes tended to move in opposite directions during the latter crisis period. 
We then proceed to analyse the stock-bond relationship at a finer level of disaggregation using ten 
equity-market sectoral indices. It reveals important differences in the stock-bond relationship 
across sectors. A feature of our results is that the positive comovement of the Financial sector and 
sovereign bonds is pervasive across the GIIPS countries, with shocks to both assets reinforcing the 
positive relationship and thereby reducing the diversification potential of these assets. Results are 
less uniform across other sectors. In Greece, all equity sectors become positively correlated with 
the domestic sovereign bond during the crisis regimes but this is the extreme case. At the other 
extreme, none of the non-financial sectors in Ireland exhibit positive comovement with the 
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government bond during the high-volatility regime. This suggests that Irish investors in domestic 
non-financial stocks and bonds continued to enjoy diversification benefits during this regime. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the econometric 
methodology and our data. Section 3 presents our empirical results and discusses their 
implications, while section 4 contains our concluding remarks. 
 
2. Econometric Methodology and Data 
2.1 Econometric model: specification and estimation 
We estimate bivariate MS-VAR models to study the time-varying relationship between 
equity market sectors and long-term government bonds across the GIIPS countries. We specify the 
vector of dependent variables as yt = {equity return, bond return}t. The bond return is always the 
return on a 10-year sovereign bond but we employ different measures of the equity return in each 
model specification. Initially we focus on the total equity market index for each country and then 
repeat the analysis at the sectoral level to provide a more disaggregated assessment of the 
relationship between equity and bond returns. We study the stability of shock transmission across 
regimes by analyzing regime-dependent GIRFs.1 The GIRFs allow us to study both the 
contemporaneous cross-market responses to asset return shocks and assess the stability of the 
dynamics of shocks across regimes.  
 In our models, we allow for up to three distinct regimes, which we identify as low-, 
intermediate-, and high-volatility market conditions. The low-volatility regime can be thought of 
as the pre-crisis, with the other regimes corresponding to different phases of the crisis. As in 
 
1 Ehrmann et al. (2003) show how to generate regime-dependent IRFs in a Markov-switching VAR and Dungey et 
al. (2018) exploit the methodology to test for cross-market contagion and decoupling using regime-dependent 
GIRFS. 
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Guidolin and Timmermann (2005), we find that two regimes are not sufficient to capture the 
market dynamics and hence opt for the higher dimension specification.2 
We estimate the following MS-VAR model: 
 =  + ∑ 
 +

 
    (1) 
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where yt is a 2x1 vector as defined above. The regression constant (λ), the matrix of autoregressive 
coefficients (θ) and the covariance matrix of residuals (σ) are all regime-dependent. St is an 
unobservable latent variable, which takes a value of unity in the non-crisis, low-volatility period, 
a value of 2 in the first phase of the crisis, when markets exhibited intermediate levels of volatility, 
a value of 3 in the more intense, high-volatility crisis regime. The evolution of the unobserved 
regime path is specified to be Markov switching and is endogenously determined by the data. The 
conditional matrix of transition probabilities has the following typical element: 
ijtt pjSiS === − ]|[Pr 1     (2) 
The model is estimated using a Bayesian Markov-chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) approach. 
We follow Dungey et al. (2018) in specifying the prior distributions for the parameters as follows. 
For the variances, we employ a Wishart distribution, the VAR coefficients have a flat prior and we 
use a weak Dirichlet prior for the transitions, with a preference towards remaining in the same 
state. Using Gibbs sampling, we estimate the parameters and regimes in the following sequence; 
Step 1: We draw the sigmas, given the mean coefficients and regimes.  
Step 2: We draw the mean coefficients (λ and θ) given sigmas and regimes. 
 
2 In a two-regime specification, the high-volatility regime tends to become an absorbing state and thus fails to pick 
up the different phases of the crisis. A number of studies of Eurozone bond markets also find that three regimes are 
required to capture this tumultuous period, e.g. Cronin et al. (2016).  
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Step 3: We draw the regimes, given the sigmas and mean coefficients. 
Step 4: We draw the transition parameters. 
This sequence of steps is repeated 10,000 times after discarding an initial ‘burn-in’ set of 
2000 replications. From the estimated parameters, we generate the regime-dependent GIRFs and 
their associated confidence bands. The GIRFs are the Choleski factors standardized to unit 
variances. This allows us to compare differences in dynamics rather than differences in variances, 
since what we are interested in is the stability of the shock transmission across regimes. 
 
2.2 Data 
 Our data set consists of daily returns on equities and long-term government bonds for each 
of the GIIPS countries. We employ Datastream-constructed total return (including dividends) 
indices for both the equity market (TOTMKCC) and constant-maturity 10-year government bonds 
(BMCC10Y).3 Later, we disaggregate the equity index into ten sectors. These are based on the 
FTSE’s Industry Classification Benchmark and the sectors are Financials, Oil & Gas, Basic 
Materials, Industrials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Telecoms, Technology, Utilities and 
Healthcare. Our sample covers the period from January 1st, 2004 to December 31st, 2015. The 
starting point is chosen so as to avoid contamination from other international financial crisis such 
as the bursting of the dot.com bubble in 2000 and the Latin-American bond crises of 2001-2. Table 
1 shows the relative importance of sectors to each of the domestic indices by reporting the average 
proportion of market capitalization attributable to each sector. The financial sector is the largest in 
 
3 Datastream-constructed total market indices are computed as market-capitalization weighted indices of the largest 
50 companies on the domestic index. The 10-year benchmark government bond index is computed as a constant-
maturity total-return index of the most liquid government bonds in accordance with the European Federation of 
Financial Analysts Society (EFFAS) methodology. In the mnemonics, CC represents a country-specific country 
code. 
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each country, while the technology and healthcare sectors tend to be relatively small across the 
GIIPS. We omit sectors that do not have data for the entire sample and sectors that, on average, 
represent less than 1% of the total domestic market capitalization. Applying these restrictions 
means that the Technology sector is excluded in each country and yields a final sample coverage 
of 9 sectors in Spain and Italy, 8 in Greece, and 6 each in Ireland and Portugal.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for all return series. Panel A reports the average 
return for each asset / index. It reveals that, over the sample period, the sovereign bond return 
slightly outperformed the total domestic equity market across all countries. The financial and 
telecom sectors did poorly in all countries, with the former recording negative average returns in 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal and the latter in all countries for which the index exists.  
Panel B reports the asset / index volatilities over the period. Stock market indices display 
far greater volatility than the bond return and, furthermore, sectoral returns are more volatile than 
the total equity market. Greek assets are usually riskier than their counterparts in other countries 
and the Greek sovereign bond return is strikingly so, with a standard deviation of more than double 
the next highest (Portugal).  
Panels C and D report skewness and kurtosis statistics respectively, for each asset / index. 
All sectoral returns exhibit skewness and strong evidence of kurtosis. Equity returns are 
predominantly negatively skewed, while bond returns tend to be positively skewed. Bond returns 
display considerable evidence of kurtosis, along with equity returns in Greece and Ireland. The 
prevalence of fat tails suggests that modeling these returns in a Markov-switching framework may 
be a better approach than in a single state setting.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
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3. Discussion of results 
3.1 Results of the MS-VAR model 
Country-specific bivariate MS-VAR models are estimated for the long-term sovereign 
bond return and the returns on each of the stock market indices described above. In all applications, 
we identify three regimes from the estimated volatilities.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Figure 1 presents the smoothed probabilities of the regimes for the total market-level 
analysis.4 It shows the prevailing financial market conditions over the sample period. For all 
countries except Ireland, a similar pattern emerges. The initial period is a clear ‘Bull’ market 
regime, associated with strong stock market and economic growth. For Greece, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain, the global banking crisis causes a transition to a crisis regime with intermediate levels of 
volatility. This is interspersed with short, intense periods of high volatility around the time of the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, which triggered turmoil and liquidity runs in international markets.5 
Markets reverted to the intermediate volatility regime before the most prolonged high-volatility 
period in 2011 when all countries became embroiled in the developing Eurozone sovereign debt 
crisis. High-volatility regimes tend to be the least persistent than but are also the most destructive 
with strongly negative returns and increasing uncertainty. The sample ends in a mainly 
intermediate-volatility regime with some sporadic spurts of growth.  
Ireland is different. After the initial period of bull markets, Ireland suffered the most intense 
period of crisis in its financial markets during the global banking crisis. During this period, the 
 
4 Similar figures are available for each specification of the model and are available upon request. However, to 
conserve space, we do not include the graphs for the sectors. 
5 Aït-Sahalia et al. (2009) attribute (in part) the ‘internationalization’ of the U.S. crisis to liquidity shortages 
following the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2010. 
10 
 
Irish banking sector suffered massive losses and the indigenous banking sector was all but wiped 
out.6 This led to a period of high-volatility, which is larger than that recorded in the domestic 
financial system during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. Interestingly, the Irish recovery starts 
relatively early and by mid-2012, markets revert to a regime of positive returns and low volatility. 
This state gives way to sporadic crisis episodes, corresponding to periods of distress for the 
common currency zone and fears for its viability due to negotiations on how to deal with the Greek 
financial and economic collapse. 
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here] 
Tables 3 and 4 contain regime-specific estimates of expected returns and volatilities 
respectively, for both equities (all indices) and the 10-year government bond. The three regimes 
have distinct characteristics. The low-volatility (non-crisis) regime has positive expected equity 
returns, consistent with a bull stock market. The first phase of the crisis is characterized by 
expected equity returns that oscillate around zero and an intermediate level of volatility, as the 
turmoil developed. While the more intense crisis regime exhibits strongly negative equity returns 
and high volatility, the typical characteristics of a bear market. The long-term bonds of Italy and 
Spain generate positive expected returns (Table 3) across all three regimes, while the expected 
bond returns in Greece, Ireland and Portugal all become negative in the regime that encompasses 
the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. In general, the magnitude of returns in the intense, high-
volatility regime is the largest but they are often imprecisely estimated due to increased volatility 
in the system. Focusing on results at the total stock market level during this regime, we find that 
the expected returns in both stock and long-term sovereign bond markets are negative, indicating 
 
6 Connor et al. (2012) provide an overview of the Irish financial crisis, detailing the collapse of the banking system 
and the government’s response to it. 
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that both markets were simultaneously suffering financial distress. Common factors such as 
liquidity shortages are likely to have played a role in both markets. 
The asset volatilities (Table 4) confirm some stylized facts. Across all sectors, stock market 
returns are more volatile than returns in the sovereign bond market except in Greece during the 
high-volatility regime. Furthermore, the volatility increases are far more pronounced for equity 
returns than bond returns as we move from the tranquil, non-crisis period to the crisis regimes.  
 
3.2 Regime-specific correlations. 
Table 5 presents the regime-specific correlations generated by the MS-VAR model. 
Though not a statistical test for the stability of relationships, they provide an overview of the 
changes in comovement across the three regimes. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
A number of interesting features of the relationship emerge from this analysis. Firstly, the low-
volatility, pre-crisis regime is predominantly associated with negative comovement between the 
two asset classes. For most stock market sectors across all countries, equity and bond returns tend 
to move in opposite directions during periods of positive stock market news as investors re-balance 
portfolios in favor of the high-yielding asset. Secondly, during the intermediate-volatility regime, 
the correlations all turn positive, implying that returns to both assets move in the same direction in 
response to shocks during this relatively stagnant period. Thirdly, and most importantly in 
assessing the diversification benefits of sovereign bonds during financial downturns, the sign of 
the correlation is not uniform across stock market sectors during the periods of intense high 
volatility. Returns for the total market and the long-term bond are positively correlated for Greece, 
Portugal and Spain but not for Ireland and Italy. As high-volatility regimes are characterised by 
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negative shocks, this suggests that for some countries, domestic sovereign bonds may not act as 
‘safe-havens’ for investors who track the domestic equity market index. However, our sectoral 
analysis reveals some crucial differences in the comovements, with only Financials exhibiting this 
tendency for positive comovement during periods of high volatility across all countries. For the 
other sectors, the pattern of correlations varies across countries. This implies that the reported 
positive relationship in the extant literature may not be prevalent across all sectors and thus that 
sovereign bonds may continue to provide a safe haven for some equity investors. 
 
3.3 Generalized Impulse Response Functions – transmission of cross-market shocks 
Thus far, the analysis suggests that bonds have some diversification benefits for equity 
investors, but their effectiveness varies across sectors of the equity market. We require a more 
thorough statistical investigation of the stock-bond relationship across different market conditions. 
Regime-dependent IRFs, as proposed by Ehrmann et al. (2003), are ideally suited to show the 
changes (and their statistical significance) in the transmission of structural shocks across different 
market conditions. As in Dungey et al. (2018), GIRFs are used here since they are invariant to the 
ordering of the variables in the specification of the VAR model. We present these here to analyze 
the transmission of shocks and their cross-market effects. The GIRFs allow us to analyze the sign 
of the responses in each regime and changes in the dynamics of the relationship across regimes. 
Furthermore, it allows us to determine if the pattern of comovements suggested by the regime-
specific correlations is statistically supported by the data. 
 
3.3.1 Market-level analysis 
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Firstly, we focus on the total equity market and the long-term sovereign bond relationship. 
Figure 2 presents the GIRFs, with 95% confidence bands. The top row shows the bond market 
reaction to a stock market shock, while the bottom row displays the stock market reaction to a 
bond market shock. Each column presents a market regime. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Across all GIIPS, the bond market either tends to not react or react negatively (opposite in sign) 
to an equity market shock during the low-volatility regime. While the contemporaneous impact is 
negative and statistically significant, the shock quickly dies out and the dynamics are not 
statistically different from zero. Unexpected good news in the stock market causes stock and bond 
markets to move in opposite directions and effect occurs within the day of the event. This is 
consistent with investors liquidating bond portfolios to increase their exposure to the equity market 
in pursuit of increased returns. This negative relationship is further reinforced by the stock market 
response to a bond market shock. Again, markets exhibit negative or zero comovement with the 
effect of the shock dying out quickly. 
 Both asset markets respond differently during the intermediate-volatility regime. Now the 
contemporaneous reaction to a shock in the other market is positive (of the same sign) and always 
statistically significant. Furthermore, the effects of the shock remain in the system for about two 
days. This suggests that the diversification potential is limited during this phase of increased 
market volatility due to the higher comovement. Furthermore, the fact that the stock market 
response to a bond shock is also positive and statistically significant shows the increasing impact 
of bond market volatility during this period.  
 Turning to the high-volatility regime, we observe less uniformity across countries. For 
Greece, Portugal and Spain, the relationship is unambiguously positive. Both stock market and 
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bond market shocks illicit a positive cross-market response in their domestic market. In both 
Greece and Spain, the reaction to the shock is more persistent than in the other regimes and 
although it turns negative (while remaining statistically different from zero) on days 2-4 after the 
shock, the sum of the reactions is positive, suggesting that overall the diversification benefits of 
sovereign bonds are limited following an equity market shock. Italian bond market shocks 
similarly give rise to a positive stock market response though, the bond market is largely 
unresponsive to a stock market shock during this period. Again, the role of the bond market as a 
source of volatility is noteworthy and is picked up by our methodology. Ireland is different with 
negative cross-market responses to a shock, but this is partially due to the difference in the timing 
of the regime. For Ireland, the high-volatility regime largely corresponds to the period of the U.S. 
banking and credit crisis and not the Eurozone sovereign bond crisis as in the other GIIPS. 
Diversification benefits continue to be delivered by the relatively tranquil bond market in this 
period before the Irish sovereign became distressed in the aftermath of the government’s blanket 
guarantee of the liabilities of its indigenous banks. However, for all countries, the crisis period in 
Eurozone debt markets in characterized by positive cross-market comovement. It appears that 
while sovereign bonds may diversify equity market risk during tranquil periods, this does not 
persist when sovereign bond markets suffer episodes of distress. This is consistent with the regime-
dependent correlations and confirms the aforementioned results of Jammazi et al. (2015), Acosta-
González et al. (2016) and Flavin (2019) for this group of markets. 
  
3.3.2 Sectoral-level analysis 
 Our results for the market-level analysis (and those in the recent literature) paint a dismal 
picture for equity investors who rely on domestic sovereign bonds to diversify their portfolios. To 
15 
 
shed more light on the stock-bond relationship for the GIIPS markets, we conduct our analysis at 
a finer level of disaggregation using stock market sectoral indices. We investigate if the market-
level results prevail across all sectors or if there are sectoral differences that might be exploited by 
investors. Figure 3 shows the GIRFs for the financial sector and Tables 6-8 summarize our results. 
Appendix 1 presents the GIRFs for all other sectors. Tables 6, 7, and 8 show the sign of the 
contemporaneous reaction to the bond market to an equity market shock (Panel A) and the stock 
market response to a bond market shock (Panel B) in the low-volatility, intermediate-volatility and 
high-volatility regime respectively. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 The sectoral analysis produces a number of striking results. Firstly, the relationship 
between returns on the financial sector and the domestic sovereign bond is the most consistent 
across countries. During the non-crisis periods, the bond appears to be a good hedging instrument 
against risk in the financial sector. The relationship is negative (or zero in the case of Ireland) and 
the sign of cross-market responses to an asset market shock do not depend on the source of the 
shock. However, as market conditions change, so does the sign of this relationship and becomes 
positive in all countries except Ireland during the intermediate-volatility regime. Even in Ireland, 
even though the contemporaneous reaction to the shock is negative, it oscillates about zero and the 
initial effect is cancelled out within a couple of days. Regardless of whether the shock originates 
in the stock or sovereign bond market, the cross-market response is in the same direction, thus 
increasing market comovement and reducing diversification potential. This relationship also 
prevails during the short, intense periods of high volatility. Therefore, it appears that domestic 
government bonds are poor diversifiers of financial-sector risk during crisis periods, especially 
when the financial distress is not contained within one particular market. Our findings are 
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consistent with the extant literature documenting the links between the banking sector and the 
sovereign during the crisis and that generally, financial crashes lead to debt crises (Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2011). Terms such as the 'deadly embrace' of Fahri and Tirole (2018) and the 'diabolical 
loop' of Brunnermeier et al. (2016) are commonly used to describe the severe financial 
consequences of the simultaneous decline in both markets. During the most recent crisis, 
difficulties in the domestic banking sector caused price declines and increased uncertainty for 
domestic sovereign bonds (see Acharya et al., 2014; and Mody and Sandri, 2012). Merton et al. 
(2013) describe the dynamics that lead to such a connection between sovereign bonds and the 
financial sector. The contingent liability created by government guarantees, either implicit or 
explicit, to the domestic banking sector may be valued as a put option on the value of the banking 
sector’s assets. The value of the put option increases as the asset values decline and / or the 
volatility of the asset values increase. Furthermore, the sensitivity of the option value increases in 
a non-linear fashion implying that consecutive declines in the value of banks’ assets will have 
increasingly large negative repercussions for the government (option writer) and this impairs the 
valuation of its sovereign debt and its ability to issue new bonds. The ‘doom loop’ of banks and 
sovereign debt is exacerbated by banks holding large amounts of sovereign debt which again can 
be valued as a put option, this time written by banks on the value of government debt. Declines in 
the value of sovereign debt lead to losses for banks, which reinforces the adverse loop between the 
two entities. This explanation fits very well with the GIIPS situation, where many banks were 
bailed out by governments or nationalized, and the falling value of government debt further 
weakened the balance sheets of already distressed banks. Given the relatively large size of the 
banking sectors in the domestic stock markets of the GIIPS countries (see Table 1)7, it is likely 
 
7 At the start of the crisis (end of Q2, 2006), the relative importance of the Financial sector in the domestic indices 
was even greater; Greece, 45%; Ireland, 55%; Italy, 42%; Portugal, 29%; and Spain 33%. 
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that this sector was the main driving force behind the observed positive relationship during the 
crisis regimes at the total market level. 
[Insert Tables 6-8 about here] 
 Secondly, across the non-financial sectors there is little uniformity except in the non-crisis 
(low-volatility) period. In this regime (Table 6), cross-market responses to a shock are generally 
negative or not statistically different from zero and this is consistent across countries. Interestingly, 
in Greece, the sovereign bond market is less responsive to equity market shocks than the equity 
market sectors are to bond shocks. However, the consistent story is that markets appear decoupled 
during the low-volatility regime. Positive news in the stock market appears to lead to portfolio 
rebalancing with investors holding more equity and smaller proportions of government bonds. 
However, once bond markets become distressed, the diversification potential of domestic 
sovereign bonds begins to wane. This is evidenced by the fact that bond shocks illicit a positive 
response in the stock market sectors just as often as the other way around. In most cases, the 
responses to shocks are reinforcing and generate a downward spiral between the two asset classes. 
This finding is consistent with evidence presented by Campbell et al. (2017) who show that in the 
U.S. high stock-bond comovement is associated with high bond return volatility. 
Thirdly, there is substantial differences across countries. The country worst affected by the 
crisis was Greece and here, it appears that there is no hiding place for investors. Once the domestic 
financial markets enter the crisis period, the stock-bond relationship turns positive across all equity 
market sectors and regardless of the source of the shock (Tables 7 and 8). This result is not 
surprising as Dungey et al. (2010) document the ‘heightened sensitivity’ of markets in crisis and 
hence the tendency to overreact to any negative news. On the other hand, Ireland and Spain are 
interesting in that during the high-volatility regime (Table 8), there were many sectors who 
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continued to be decoupled from the sovereign bond market (i.e. exhibit a negative or zero response 
to a cross-market shock). In Ireland, the bond market continued to react negatively to non-financial 
sector equity shocks and this was also true for the majority of sectors in Spain. For these sectors, 
the domestic sovereign bond fulfilled the requirements of a safe-haven asset. In Italy and Portugal, 
some sectors remain decoupled from the sovereign bond, e.g. Telecoms in Italy and Basic 
Materials in Portugal. However, there is little pattern to reassure investors in identifying these 
sectors.  
In summary, our results show that domestic sovereign bonds are not a suitable risk 
diversifier for investors in financial equities due to their tendency to fall together during a crisis. 
In general, bond market volatility limits the effectiveness of sovereign bonds as a hedging 
instrument for any equity sectors but there are some exceptions. The problem facing investors is 
to identify these a priori. Our evidence suggests that equities and sovereign bonds remained largely 
decoupled during the high-volatility regime in Ireland, and to a lesser extent, Spain but there is 
little other pattern to guide investors.  
 
4. Conclusions 
 We examine the stock-bond relationship for the GIIPS countries and, in particular, analyze 
its stability across different market conditions. This is an important issue in assessing the 
diversification potential of long-term government bonds for equity investors. The recent literature 
suggests that the Eurozone peripheral countries are different to other big developed financial 
markets in that returns to equity and sovereign bonds became positively correlated during the 
recent financial crisis and hence long-term sovereign bonds do not provide a safe haven for equity 
investors and offer limited diversification benefits against adverse stock market shocks.  
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Employing a MS-VAR model, we confirm this result for the total market. However, a 
sectoral analysis sheds greater light on the driving force behind this finding. In fact, the financial 
sector is the most consistent driver of this positive comovement across countries. Two-way 
feedbacks between domestic banks and sovereign debt markets served to amplify the initial 
financial disturbance through the transfer of banking debts and risks to the sovereign during the 
crisis and relatively large holdings of domestic government by the banking sector. This meant that 
the fortunes of the banking sector and sovereign debt instruments became inextricably linked and 
that sovereign bonds were no longer suitable ‘safe-haven’ assets for holders of financial stocks. 
 In general, the relationship between equity market sectors and the domestic sovereign bond 
becomes positive as markets enter a crisis regime. It appears that this is mainly associated with 
periods of bond market volatility and inflation uncertainty (see Campbell et al., 2017). However, 
are some notable exceptions. During high-volatility regimes in Ireland and Spain, many sectors 
exhibit a negative relationship with the domestic sovereign bond. Without any government 
guarantees for firms operating in these sectors, their fortunes appear to be largely disconnected 
from the long-term sovereign bond during periods of financial distress. Hence, equity investors in 
Ireland and Spain continue to enjoy diversification benefits from holding domestic sovereign 
bonds. While there are a number of examples in Italy and Portugal across the different phases of 
the crisis, there is little pattern to guide investors a priori in identifying which sectors are likely to 
remain decoupled from the sovereign bond. It is, therefore, probably advisable for investors to 
seek alternative safe-haven assets such as precious metal or non-domestic sovereign bonds. Policy 
makers need to be cognizant of the spillovers from equity market shocks to sovereign bonds. 
Financial shocks tend to generate contagious effects for domestic bonds and thus resilience needs 
to be built into the financial system to curb contagion.  
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Table 1. Average proportion of Total Market Capitalization by sector 
 
 Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
Financials 39.1 27.1 34.8 20.5 33.4 
Basic Materials 4.1 4.4 3.6 7.8 2.0 
Industrials 7.8 19.8 9.3 12.3 11.7 
Cons. Services 14.0 23.2 4.1 24.2 12.2 
Cons. Goods 11.2 20.6 10.0 0.7 1.6 
Telecoms 10.7 0.02 5.4 12.1 13.8 
Technology 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.6 
Utilities 6.3 NA 14.8 21.9 16.4 
Healthcare 0.4 NA 1.3 0.2 2.1 
Oil & Gas 6.1 4.6 16.2 NA 6.2 
 
Notes: These are the average proportions (expressed in percentages) of market 
capitalization attributable to each sector over the whole sample. NA signifies that this 
sector does not exist in the indicated country. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
 Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
Panel A: Mean  
Total Market -0.0554 0.0234 0.0155 0.0084 0.0255 
10-Year Bond  0.0064 0.0260 0.0272 0.0278 0.0259 
Financials -0.1776 -0.0733 0.0010 -0.0669 0.0094 
Basic Materials 0.0014 -0.1029 0.0324 0.0450 0.0193 
Industrials 0.0043 0.0814 0.0190 0.0039 0.0315 
Consumer Services 0.0083 0.0474 -0.0010 0.0296 0.0565 
Consumer Goods 0.0551 0.0063 0.0456 NA 0.0404 
Telecoms -0.0394 NA -0.0125 -0.0446 -0.0123 
Utilities -0.0283 NA 0.0261 0.0357 0.0420 
Healthcare NA NA 0.0514 NA 0.0518 
Oil & Gas 0.0098 0.0438 0.0188 NA 0.0097 
Panel B: Volatility 
Total Market 2.0310 1.4032 1.3609 1.1849 1.3332 
10-Year Bond  1.8564 0.5541 0.4794 0.7909 0.4833 
Financials 3.4349 3.5621 1.8199 2.1815 1.7869 
Industrials  2.2302 4.5243 2.1798 1.3596 1.4335 
Basic Materials 2.0056 2.1206 1.3226 1.3957 1.3331 
Consumer Services 1.8030 1.5871 1.3043 1.4004 1.4619 
Consumer Goods 1.9923 1.7808 1.4440 NA 0.8848 
Telecoms 4.9722 NA 2.2135 1.7851 1.6872 
Utilities 2.5479 NA 1.2759 1.5088 1.3401 
Healthcare NA NA 1.1845 NA 1.3511 
Oil & Gas 2.0910 2.8608 1.6428 NA 1.5794 
Panel C: Skewness 
Total Market -0.5060 -0.6216 -0.1304 -0.2623 0.0345 
10-Year Bond  1.2165 0.5192 0.6877 -0.5242 0.9671 
Financials -0.5372 -1.6206 -0.1163 0.0387 0.3593 
Industrials  -0.2346 -0.2311 -0.4312 -0.0901 -0.1820 
Basic Materials -0.4334 0.8909 -0.3539 -0.4946 -0.3150 
Consumer Services -0.2644 -0.8460 -0.1684 -0.3295 0.1580 
Consumer Goods -0.2037 -1.0244 -0.0714 NA -0.0641 
Telecoms -0.3851 NA 4.1392 -0.3644 -1.4511 
Utilities -0.4959 NA -0.2569 -0.2557 -0.0761 
Healthcare NA NA -0.2696 NA -0.6001 
Oil & Gas -0.0810 -0.2953 0.2067 NA -0.3471 
Panel D: Kurtosis  
Total Market 9.3912 7.8573 5.3461 7.4861 5.9083 
10-Year Bond  90.9572 30.2781 18.0319 42.8956 15.3000 
Financials 10.0147 36.5509 4.4157 5.5839 8.7324 
Industrials  5.4177 7.4404 8.1366 4.3539 3.4578 
Basic Materials 5.4287 17.2291 2.7633 14.1964 3.6935 
Consumer Services 4.5935 11.5175 2.4402 5.5132 4.0571 
Consumer Goods 4.3353 37.2454 3.5675 NA 8.5577 
Telecoms 6.3034  NA 150.7328 18.5729 28.3445 
Utilities 7.4901  NA 6.6666 10.5101 7.3695 
Healthcare NA  NA 2.1111 NA 7.6829 
Oil & Gas 3.6263 14.7633 10.0970 NA 6.1392 
 
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the daily percentage returns on the total stock market index, the 10-
year government bond, and the sectoral equity indices used in the study. The means are geometric means and volatility 
is measured as the standard deviation of return. NA signifies that there was no (or partial) data available for that sector 
and it has been omitted. 
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Table 3: Estimates of Expected Returns across Regimes 
  
 TOTMK FINAN BMATR INDUS CNSMG CNSMS TELCM UTILS HLTHC OILGS 
L
o
w
-v
o
la
ti
li
ty
 
Greece  0.060 0.062 0.091 0.075 0.135 0.043 0.094 -0.007 NA 0.058 
0.013 0.013 0.016 0.012 0.014 0.015 0.018 0.017  0.016 
Ireland  0.129 0.087 0.052 0.093 0.094 0.108 
NA NA NA 
0.086 
0.035 0.015 0.021 0.035 0.035 -0.023 0.035 
Italy 0.148 0.112 0.126 0.184 0.146 0.094 0.010 0.111 0.141 0.103 
0.019 0.014 0.041 0.025 0.031 0.010 0.020 0.019 0.044 0.029 
Portugal  0.102 0.080 0.088 0.129 NA 0.092 0.047 0.101 NA NA 
0.013 0.020 0.019 0.014  0.017 0.018 0.018   
Spain  0.158 0.124 0.155 0.158 0.071 0.153 0.071 0.112 0.109 0.104 
0.015 0.013 0.023 0.029 0.024 0.021 0.020 0.027 0.023 0.023 
In
te
rm
ed
ia
te
-v
o
la
ti
li
ty
  
Greece  -0.109 -0.228 -0.070 -0.039 0.037 0.010 -0.006 -0.071 NA -0.075 
0.035 0.047 0.028 0.022 0.020 0.023 0.024 0.028  0.024 
Ireland  0.002 -0.160 -0.186 0.121 -0.063 -0.009 
NA NA NA 
-0.026 
-0.017 0.055 0.051 -0.024 -0.028 -0.023 -0.018 
Italy -0.032 0.017 0.017 -0.240 0.023 -0.048 -0.179 0.021 0.074 -0.067 
0.014 0.044 0.023 0.036 0.010 0.049 -0.014 0.047 0.029 0.002 
Portugal  -0.025 -0.122 -0.027 -0.070 NA 0.031 -0.020 0.035 NA 
NA 
0.020 0.024 0.024 0.026  0.015 0.032 0.092  
Spain  -0.031 -0.013 -0.079 -0.046 -0.018 0.062 0.009 -0.014 0.067 -0.021 
0.029 0.036 0.005 0.014 0.007 0.018 0.023 0.010 0.025 0.021 
H
ig
h
-v
o
la
ti
li
ty
 
Greece  -0.464 -0.697 -0.154 -0.358 -0.421 -0.271 -0.211 -0.004 NA -0.037 
-0.284 -0.176 -0.160 -0.389 -0.368 -0.252 -0.168 -0.256  -0.308 
Ireland  -0.216 -0.018 -0.283 0.025 -0.253 -0.095 
NA NA NA 
0.062 
0.026 -0.073 -0.036 0.027 0.032 0.039 0.023 
Italy -0.211 -0.255 -0.180 -0.014 -0.175 -0.066 0.009 -0.432 -0.330 -0.355 
0.040 -0.005 -0.008 0.005 0.025 -0.015 0.046 -0.027 -0.036 0.027 
Portugal  -0.257 -0.094 -0.008 -0.276 NA -0.234 -0.146 -0.062 NA 
NA 
0.098     0.063 0.026 0.055  0.070 0.028 0.011  
Spain  -0.216 -0.131 -0.218 -0.235 0.021 -0.030 -0.339 -0.271 -0.297 -0.349 
0.011 0.013 0.032 0.029 0.042 0.031 0.017 0.032 0.037 0.018 
 
Notes: This Table presents the regime-specific expected returns, generated by the estimated model, for equities (µE – 
top number in each cell) and the 10-year government bond (µB – bottom number in each cell).  NA signifies that there was 
no (or partial) data available for that sector and it has been omitted. 
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Table 4: Estimates of Volatilities across Regimes  
 
 TOTMK FINAN BMATR INDUS CNSMG CNSMS TELCM UTILS HLTHC OILGS 
L
o
w
-v
o
la
ti
li
ty
 
Greece  1.049 1.792 1.564 2.695 2.081 1.476 1.703 2.214 NA 2.310 
0.068 0.066 0.064 0.080 0.078 0.072 0.065 0.068  0.077 
Ireland  0.568 0.754 0.855 1.520 0.802 1.198 
NA NA NA 
3.212 
0.060 0.054 0.060     0.062 0.075 0.059 0.066 
Italy 0.467 0.403 0.961 0.534 0.823 0.421 1.093 0.496 1.021 1.195 
   0.066 0.059 0.088 0.070 0.075 0.056 0.061 0.058 0.176 0.076 
Portugal  0.339 0.354 0.281 0.698 NA 0.387 0.910 0.894 NA NA 
0.061 0.058 0.060 0.061  0.057 0.069 0.071   
Spain  0.369 0.513 0.769 0.646 0.336 0.464 1.125 0.628 0.503 0.820 
0.054 0.058 0.069 0.072 0.076 0.060 0.085 0.078 0.057 0.067 
In
te
rm
ed
ia
te
-v
o
la
ti
li
ty
 
Greece  3.944 9.098 5.881 3.497 3.862 3.507 7.147 5.733 NA 4.425 
0.888 0.722 0.601 1.310 1.240 1.006 0.696 0.846  1.206 
Ireland  2.181 5.984 13.969 4.265 1.672 1.809 
NA NA NA 
5.324 
1.496 0.098 0.097 1.553 1.352 1.459 1.443 
Italy 3.048 2.491 5.713 2.875 2.652 1.956 5.253 1.606 1.133 3.105 
0.787 0.101 0.082 0.177 0.893 0.116 0.985 0.159 0.089 0.930 
Portugal  1.447 3.819 2.628 1.931 NA 2.226 3.604 2.599 NA 
NA 
0.294 0.201 1.964 0.362  0.277 3.200 4.376  
Spain  1.568 2.353 1.865 1.978 0.711 2.727 1.357 2.647 1.689 2.782 
0.160 0.141 0.695 0.652 0.643 0.710 0.205 0.700 0.154 0.207 
H
ig
h
-v
o
la
ti
li
ty
 
Greece  16.026 48.433 10.890 13.435 12.908 9.560 21.706 24.003 NA 13.979 
24.832 20.276 20.001 29.995 26.685 25.687 21.136 22.709  27.152 
Ireland  5.168 51.781 76.117 12.589 10.792 7.038 
NA NA NA 
35.284 
0.154 1.217 1.324 0.177 0.084 0.185 0.226 
Italy 3.712 10.453 12.178 3.378 4.924 3.742 6.347 6.076 4.296 11.241 
0.158 0.850 0.877 0.832 0.116 0.982 0.229 1.183 1.310 0.188 
Portugal  5.982 17.875 2.851 10.339 NA 6.744 6.704 4.453 NA 
NA 
4.762 3.305 1.372 6.026  4.358 0.299 0.375  
Spain  6.267 10.944 4.702 4.289 2.510 3.526 8.519 6.085 6.259 10.223 
0.876 0.775 0.183 0.144 0.156 0.148 0.908 0.195 1.055 1.082 
 
Notes: This Table presents the regime-specific variances, generated by the estimated model, for equities (top number 
in each cell) and the 10-year government bond (bottom number in each cell).  NA signifies that there was no (or partial) 
data available for that sector and it has been omitted. 
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Table 5: Regime-Specific Correlations 
 
 Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
Panel A: Low-volatility regime  
Total Market -0.0768 -0.0316 -0.0153 -0.0473 -0.1196 
Financials -0.1657 -0.0519 -0.1141 -0.0586 -0.1568 
Basic Materials -0.0973 0.0245 0.0782 0.0160 -0.0658 
Industrials -0.0799 0.0242 0.0352 -0.1222 0.0309 
Consumer Services -0.0947 -0.0119 -0.0973 0.0028 -0.0606 
Consumer Goods -0.0967 -0.0301 0.0152 NA -0.0178 
Telecoms -0.0762 NA -0.0540 -0.0306 -0.1808 
Utilities -0.1102 NA -0.0941 -0.0408 -0.0615 
Healthcare NA NA 0.1712 NA -0.0306 
Oil & Gas -0.051 -0.0309 -0.0435 NA -0.0860 
Panel B: Intermediate-volatility regime  
Total Market 0.2415 0.2851 0.6223 0.0238 0.0914 
Financials 0.2683 0.0323 0.1147 0.0917 0.1341 
Industrials  0.2453 0.2431 -0.1638 0.0332 0.3954 
Basic Materials 0.1691 -0.0203 -0.2382 0.2760 0.3994 
Consumer Services 0.1397 0.1160 0.0001 0.0212 0.3846 
Consumer Goods 0.0747 0.0761 0.4245 NA 0.3148 
Telecoms 0.1987 NA 0.6207 0.5022 0.3812 
Utilities 0.2221 NA 0.2419 0.2728 0.4888 
Healthcare NA NA -0.1003 NA 0.0142 
Oil & Gas 0.2494 0.0782 0.5003 NA 0.1027 
Panel C: High-volatility regime  
Total Market 0.2751 -0.2806 -0.0690 0.3384 0.3506 
Financials 0.2099 0.1135 0.5135 0.3004 0.1902 
Industrials  0.2863 -0.1837 0.5762 0.2830 -0.3205 
Basic Materials 0.3264 -0.0634 0.1415 -0.0295 -0.2492 
Consumer Services 0.2541 -0.1836 0.5241 0.3701 -0.1100 
Consumer Goods 0.1339 -0.0360 -0.2000 NA -0.1408 
Telecoms 0.2738 NA -0.0064 -0.0036 0.2461 
Utilities 0.2446 NA 0.3060 0.0344 -0.2420 
Healthcare NA NA 0.2651 NA 0.1142 
Oil & Gas 0.1900 -0.1658 -0.1115 NA 0.1941 
Notes: This presents the regime-dependent pairwise correlations between long-term bonds and equities market 
generated by our MS-VAR model. NA signifies that there was no (or partial) data available for that sector and it has 
been omitted. NA signifies that there was no (or partial) data available for that sector and it has been omitted. 
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Table 6. Cross-market contemporaneous responses of markets during the low-volatility regime 
 
Panel A: Response of Sovereign Bond Market to a shock in the indicated equity market 
sector 
 Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
Total Market N Z Z N N 
Financials N Z N N N 
Basic Materials Z Z P Z N 
Industrials Z Z Z N Z 
Consumer Services Z Z N N N 
Consumer Goods Z Z Z NA N 
Telecoms Z NA N N N 
Utilities Z NA N Z N 
Healthcare NA NA Z NA N 
Oil & Gas Z Z Z NA N 
Panel B: Response of indicated equity market sector to a sovereign bond shock 
Total Market N Z N N N 
Financials N Z N N N 
Basic Materials N Z Z Z N 
Industrials N Z Z N Z 
Consumer Services N Z N N N 
Consumer Goods N Z Z NA Z 
Telecoms N NA N N N 
Utilities N NA Z N N 
Healthcare NA NA Z NA N 
Oil & Gas N Z Z NA N 
Notes: N, Z and P denote that the contemporaneous response was negative, zero and positive respectively. NA 
signifies that there was no (or partial) data available for that sector and it has been omitted. 
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Table 7: Cross-market contemporaneous responses of markets during the intermediate-volatility 
regime 
 
Panel A: Response of Sovereign Bond Market to a shock in the indicated equity market 
sector 
 Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
Total Market P P P P P 
Financials P N P P P 
Basic Materials P Z N Z P 
Industrials P P Z P P 
Consumer Services P P Z Z P 
Consumer Goods P P P NA P 
Telecoms P NA P P P 
Utilities P NA P P P 
Healthcare NA NA Z NA Z 
Oil & Gas P Z P NA P 
Panel B: Response of indicated equity market sector to a sovereign bond shock 
Total Market P P P P P 
Financials P N P P P 
Basic Materials  P Z P Z P 
Industrials  P N N P P 
Consumer Services P P Z Z P 
Consumer Goods P P P NA P 
Telecoms P NA P P P 
Utilities P NA P P P 
Healthcare NA NA Z NA P 
Oil & Gas P Z P NA P 
Notes: N, Z and P denote that the contemporaneous response was negative, zero and positive respectively. NA 
signifies that there was no (or partial) data available for that sector and it has been omitted. 
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Table 8: Cross-market contemporaneous responses of markets during the high-volatility regime 
 
Panel A: Response of Sovereign Bond Market to a shock in the indicated equity market 
sector 
 Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
Total Market P N Z P P 
Financials P P P P P 
Basic Materials P Z P Z N 
Industrials P N P P N 
Consumer Services P N P P N 
Consumer Goods P Z N NA N 
Telecoms P NA Z Z P 
Utilities P NA P Z N 
Healthcare NA NA P NA P 
Oil & Gas P N N NA P 
Panel B: Response of indicated equity market sector to a sovereign bond shock 
Total Market P N P P P 
Financials P P P P P 
Basic Materials  P Z N Z N 
Industrials  P P P P N 
Consumer Services P N P P N 
Consumer Goods P Z N NA N 
Telecoms P NA Z P P 
Utilities P NA P P N 
Healthcare NA NA P NA N 
Oil & Gas P Z N NA P 
Notes: N, Z and P denote that the contemporaneous response was negative, zero and positive respectively. NA 
signifies that there was no (or partial) data available for that sector and it has been omitted. 
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Figure 1. Regime  Probabilities 
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Figure 1. Continued. 
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Figure 1. Continued 
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Figure 2. Total Market and 10-year Sovereign Bond 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
Fig 2. Continued. 
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Fig 2. Continued 
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Fig 2. Continued. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
 
Fig 2. Continued. 
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Figure 3. Financials and 10-year Sovereign Bond 
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Fig 3. Continued. 
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Fig 3. Continued 
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Fig 3. Continued. 
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Fig 3. Continued. 
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Appendix 1. Figures for all other sectors 
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